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GROSS PRESUMPTIONS: DETERMINING
GROUP ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT PREFERENCES
George R. La Noue" & John C. Sullivan-
I. INTRODUCTION
While there has been substantial administrative
reformulation of federally-sponsored Minority Business
Enterprise (MBE) programs' after the Supreme Court's
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2 the key
premise upon which all these programs rest remains
unchanged. Despite frequently voiced judicial skepticism
about the broad use of racial classifications, all federal MBE
programs are based on the "presumption" that every member
of certain racial and ethnic groups is "socially," and to some
degree "economically," "disadvantaged."3 This article explores
the historical origins, administrative applications,
* M.A. and Ph.D., Yale University; B.A., Hanover College. The author is
Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland Baltimore County.
** J.D., University of Maryland Law School; B.A., Loyola College. The
author is Associate Director of the Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts.
1. The major federal MBE programs are the Small Business
Administration's ("SBA") 8(a) program, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2000), the Socially
Disadvantaged Business (SDB) program, 13 C.F.R. pt 124 covering all federal
procurement, and the U.S. Department of Transportation's Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise (DBE) program, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998),
although there are many other smaller programs. See Congressional Research
Serv., Library of Congress, Compilation and Overview of Federal Laws and
Regulations Establishing Affirmative Action Goals or Other Preferences Based
on Race, Gender, or Ethnicity (1995). In each of these programs, the SBA
determines the particular racial and ethnic groups which the law considers
presumptively disadvantaged. Some preference programs, as required by
statute, also include women business enterprises (WBEs), but the SBA found in
1982 that women were not a presumptively disadvantaged group. See George
R. La Noue & John C. Sullivan, Presumptions for Preferences: The Small
Business Administration's Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action, 6
J. POLV HIST. 452-53 (1994).
2. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1994).
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contemporary social science research, and constitutional law
related to this presumption.
Since the Supreme Court decided Adarand v. Pena in
June 1995, it is clear that the constitutional standard for
evaluating race conscious policies in federal procurement is
strict scrutiny. The Court stated: "Taken together, these
three propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any
racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."'
The Adarand Court went on to quote Justice Powell's
conclusion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke'
about the need for strict scrutiny:
Political judgments regarding the necessity for the
particular [racial or ethnic] classification may be weighed
in the constitutional balance, but the standard of
justification will remain constant. This is as it should be,
since those political judgments are the product of rough
compromises struck by contending groups within the
democratic process. When they touch upon an individual's
race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial
determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that
basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.6
In response to Adarand, the Department of Justice
issued its "Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal
Procurement." This document recognized that:
In Adarand, the Supreme Court had extended strict
judicial scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs
that use racial or ethnic criteria as a basis for decision-
making. In procurement, this means that any use of race
in the decision to award a contract is subject to strict
scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, any federal program that
makes race a basis for contract decision-making must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.'
4. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 224.
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Id. at 299, quoted in Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 224-25.
7. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042 (1996).
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With regard to this two-prong test of compelling interest
and narrow tailoring, the "Proposed Reforms" adopted a
status quo position regarding compelling interest: "The
Justice Department takes as a constitutionally justified
premise that affirmative action in federal procurement is
necessary and that the federal government has a compelling
interest to act on that basis in the award of federal
contracts."8
The document conceded, however, that federal
procurement rules needed to be altered to meet the narrow
tailoring test:
The structure of affirmative action in contracting set forth
herein will not be simple to implement and will
undoubtedly be improved through further refinement.
Agencies will have to make judgments and observe
limitations in the use of race-conscious measures, and
make concentrated race neutral efforts that are not
required under current practice. The Supreme Court,
however, has changed the rules governing federal
affirmative action.9
After the declaration, the Federal Register was
published, but it took more than two years for the publication
of the new regulations covering the 8(a),1° SDB,11 and DBE
programs. While these regulations sought to narrowly tailor
8. Id. The Department supported its position by publishing a 14 page
document called, "The Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal
Procurement: A Preliminary Survey." 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042 app. (1996). The
federal government has relied on this preliminary survey in all of the post-
Adarand cases challenging federal MBE programs. In two cases, courts
accepted with caveats that the survey created a compelling interest, but then
found the MBE program unconstitutional on narrow tailoring grounds. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997) (Adarand
II), vacating as moot 169 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit decision
was vacated and remanded in a per curiam Supreme Court decision. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000). See also In re Sherbrooke
Sodding Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Minn. 1998).
In Rothe Dev. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 49 F. Supp 2d 937 (W.D. Tex.
1999), however, a district court upheld the National Defense Authorization Act
§ 1207, 10 U.S.C.S. § 2323 (2000), 10% DBE price preference on both compelling
interest and narrow tailoring grounds. The Fifth Circuit entered a stay on that
decision, 194 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1999), and the case is now on appeal to the
federal circuit court of appeals.
9. 61 Fed. Reg. 20,646, 20,650 (1996).
10. 63 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1998).
11. 63 Fed. Reg. 35,767 (1998).
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the use of race and ethnicity in federal procurement in
several respects, they did not examine or propose for future
examination any consideration of the particular groups
entitled to the presumption of social and economic
disadvantage. In fact, there has been no post-Adarand
review of which groups should receive racial and ethnic
preferences in federal contracting by any part of the federal
government. For many groups, decisions were made more
than two decades ago and there has never been a subsequent
review. 2
In federal MBE programs, persons identifying with the
designated racial and ethnic groups do not need to be actually
"disadvantaged" based on their individual experiences and
characteristics. Instead, they are presumed disadvantaged
and the firms they own are eligible to be certified to receive
the benefits of federal MBE programs." If a particular firm
owner is certified by the Small Business Administration or by
another federal agency as identifying with a designated racial
and/or ethnic group, government administrators awarding
prime contracts and prime contractors awarding subcontracts
are instructed to presume that the owner is socially and
economically disadvantaged. 4 A firm owned by that person is
entitled to preferential treatment in competing for a variety
of federal contracts.
The presumption of social disadvantage is in practice
absolute, 5 while there are some limits on the economic
presumption. Firms cannot exceed a certain size measured by
gross revenues and owners cannot exceed certain limits of
personal net worth. As a measure of disadvantage, however,
12. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Amended Requests
for Admission (Jan. 15, 1998), DynAlantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 937 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), request Nos. 13-14.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2000).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (2000).
15. The presumption of social disadvantage is theoretically rebuttable, but
in fact that virtually never occurs. Calvin Jenkins, SBA Administrator, could
not remember any instance when a challenge to an individual presumption had
occurred. See Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 32-41, 141 (Mar. 18, 1996), C.S.
McCrossan Constr. Co. v. Cook, No. CIV. 95-1345, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721
(D.N.M. 1996). Furthermore the challenge could only be made to whether an
individual was properly identifying with a particular group. There is no right to
challenge the selection of a group after the SBA has made a finding that the
group has qualified for the presumption.
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the firm and net worth limitations are exceedingly generous.
In construction, for example, the firm size limitations of
$16,000,000 to $18,000,000 of annual revenues make 98% of
the construction businesses in the country eligible as "small"
businesses. 6
In the 8(a) program, the definition of economic
disadvantage encompasses individuals whose personal net
worth does not exceed $250,000 (not counting the worth of the
owner's residence or business) to enter the program and
$750,000 to remain in the program.' The Small
Disadvantaged Business (SDB) and Department of
Transportation (DBE) programs use the $750,000 limit for
both entry and remaining in the program. The 1998 SDB
regulations explain how the presumption works:
The presumption of disadvantage for Federal SDB is
based on the authority set forth in Section 8(d) of the
Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 637(d). Section
8(d)(3)(C)(ii) clearly authorizes a presumption of both
social and economic disadvantage for members of certain
designated groups. When members of the designated
groups represent that they are disadvantaged, as a part of
a firm's application for SDB status, they represent to SBA
that they meet the $750,000 net worth requirement for
economic disadvantage. Absent credible evidence to the
contrary, SBA will accept this representation because of
the statutory presumption. 8
The SBA does not know how many citizens qualify as
"economically disadvantaged" under the net worth limits. 9
The Department of Justice has conceded that it was aware of
no studies by either Congress or the SBA about the
percentage of Americans who would qualify under either of
the economic disadvantage income limits. 0
16. See Letter from Patricia L. Horning, Chief, Construction and Mineral
Census Branch, Bureau of the Census, to John Sullivan, Associate Director of
the Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts (Jan. 23, 1996) (on file with
John Sullivan).
17. See 13 C.F.R. 124.106 (2000).
18. 8(a) Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status
Determination, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,767, 35,770 (1998).
19. See Deposition of William Fisher at 133-35 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
20. See Responses to Requests for Admission, McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, responses to request Nos. 23-24.
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The question was asked, however, during a
Congressional hearing in 1995. Philip Lader, administrator
of the Small Business Administration, provided a proximate
answer. He testified:
Information abstracted from the Federal Reserve Board
Finance Survey (1992) indicates that 19.4% of the families
that own businesses in the United States exceed the entry
level ceiling ($250,000, excluding primary residence and
business equity) for participating in the 8(a) program as
defined by SBA regulations. In terms of continuing 8(a)
program eligibility criteria ($750,000 with the
aforementioned exclusions) 8.4% of families owning
businesses in the United States would exceed the net
worth ceiling as defined by the SBA. It should be noted
that the federal reserve data is based on family net worth,
while the SBA definition refers to individual net worth.2'
As Mr. Lader demonstrated, even using family net worth
rather than individual net worth, more than 91% of all
business owners would be considered economically
disadvantaged because they were below the $750,000 limit.
In short, according to the regulations almost all
businesses are defined as "small" and considerably more than
80-90% of all Americans are considered "economically
disadvantaged" by the net worth limits. Thus, the actual
screening criteria for entrance into the federal preference
programs for almost everyone are the racial and ethnic
presumptions of social disadvantage.
Presumptive eligibility involves a very large presumption
indeed. Put simply, it assumes that the federal government
should classify American business owners into two groups on
the basis of their race and ethnicity. Owners in the first
group are presumed to be socially disadvantaged and entitled
to benefits. Owners in the second group are presumed to be
socially advantaged and excluded from these benefits. In
practice, presumptive eligibility in federal MBE programs
means that two business owners with identical economic
status, who have gone to the same schools, live in the same
communities, and have the same business histories are
21. The Small Business Administration's Minority Business Development
Program, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong. 42
(1995).
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treated very differently in competition for federal contracts if
they have different racial and/or ethnic identities.
For the business owner who is in a presumptively eligible
group and meets the economic criteria, certification in the
8(a), SDB or DBE programs is a major competitive advantage
in accessing billions of contracting dollars annually. Until
1998, for the business owner in the non-presumptively
eligible groups, admission to these programs required proof
by "clear and convincing evidence" that he or she has suffered
"chronic racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias."22 This
was a major barrier guarded by a very unsympathetic
bureaucracy. In 1996, only 10 of the 6,115 firms in the 8(a)
portfolio of firms (0.16%) were white owned.23 Even in the
case of the O'Donnell Construction company which proved to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that as a
white male-owned company it had been discriminated against
by the district's MBE program, 4 the SBA refused to concede
the firm had suffered from racial prejudice. O'Donnell finally
received 8(a) status when an administrative law judge
overturned the SBA administrators.25
The 1998 post-Adarand regulations reduced the barrier
for persons not identified with presumptively eligible groups
who must individually demonstrate discrimination from a
"clear and convincing" evidence standard to a
"preponderance" of evidence standard.26  Since the
presumption of disadvantage for members of some racial and
ethnic group members remains, there is still a double
standard. Neither Congress nor the courts have suggested
that this double standard solves the legal problem. No
legislative history or law was cited for the changes. Perhaps
the SBA believed that by adding a few firms whose owners
actually demonstrated personal disadvantage to these
programs that the programs would be more politically
22. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(c)(1).
23. See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF MINORITY
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT, A REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON MINORITY
SMALL BuSINESS AND CAPITAL OWNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1996 at 23.
24. See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
25. See In re. O'Donnell Constr. Co., No. MSBE-94-9-26-43 (May 15, 1995).
26. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 35,726-35,728 (1998).
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palatable or that the change would camouflage the fact that
these programs are still dependant on racial classifications.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMPTIVE ELIGIBILITY
Which are the presumptively eligible groups? Any
American citizen or legal resident who can show ancestry or
identify with the following groups is presumptively eligible
under federal regulations:
Black Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native Americans
(American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts or Native
Hawaiians); Asian Pacific Americans (persons with origins
from Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore,
Brunei, Japan, China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan,
Laos, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Vietnam, Korea, The
Philippines, U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(Republic of Palau), Republic of the Marshall Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, The Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Samoa, Macao, Fiji,
Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, or Nauru); Subcontinent Asian
American (persons with origins from India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives Islands or
Nepal).27
As will be shown, Congress initiated this list, '8 but the
SBA has been delegated and has actively applied the
29authority to decide whether to add groups. Being a
designated disadvantaged group is the first step in
determining presumptive eligibility. The second step is the
individual firm owner's claim of identification with one of the
groups. Sometimes that is simple, but in modern America
where many persons have multiple ethnic identifications, it
may be complex. The SBA alone decides which criteria are to
be used in determining whether a firm owner has properly
claimed identification with a presumptively eligible group.
While a history of discrimination against some of the
designated groups is well known, the SBA list is certainly not
exhaustive of all groups that have suffered discrimination or
social disadvantage in the United States. Many of the groups
27. 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2000).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(c) (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1) (2000).
29. See Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 30-32 (Mar. 18, 1998), Rothe Dev.
Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
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on the SBA list are relatively recent arrivals to this country
and there is little, if any, evidence of any systematic bias
directed against them. It is not apparent that any person
from some of the micro-states on the list has formed a
business in the United States or even lives here."
Nevertheless, any American business owner who can claim
identity with any listed group is legally considered socially
and economically disadvantaged.
This fact can be seen by examining the instructions in
the SDB application form which states: "In accordance with
13 C.F.R. Sec. 124.1002, designated group members are
presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged.
Designated group members are individuals who hold
themselves out to be and are identified by others as Black
Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Subcontinent Asian Americans and Asian Pacific
Americans."31
In its post-Adarand statement on public contracting, the
Justice Department avoided discussing the issue of why
certain groups are presumed disadvantaged, while others are
not. The Department's post-Adarand memorandum to
general counsels of federal agencies on employment, however,
correctly states that race and ethnic conscious programs must
be group specific: "Treating minorities as a single group
raises concerns; remedial action in federal employment can
be targeted only at specific groups determined to have a need
for special focus."82
The political sensitivities involved are readily
understood. If a group currently considered presumptively
eligible for contracting preferences was to be excluded
because there was no basis for inclusion or because there is
30. In 1989, SBA added persons from Nauru and Tuvalu to the
presumptively eligible list, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,717 (1989), even though there are
only about 10,000 residents on each of these islands. See CIA, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK 297, 432 (1995).
31. 1998 SDB application form, at 1.
32. Memorandum from John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, to the
U.S. Department of Justice, "Post-Adarand Guidance on Affirmative Action in
Federal Employment," Office of the Associate Attorney General Memo 17 (1996)
(on file with the U.S. Dep't of Justice). There is no logical or constitutional
reason to believe that the strict scrutiny requirement is any different in
preferential public employment and public procurement programs.
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no longer such a basis, that might undermine the political
coalition supporting the program. There is no doubt that the
equal protection standard requires that there be justification
for the inclusion of each specific group in a program that is
race or ethnic conscious.
In 1980, dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court first
raised this issue in Fullilove v. Klutznick33 but were ignored
by the majority. Justices Stewart and Stevens dealt
specifically with the issue of the fairness of the manner in
which groups were chosen for preferences. Justice Stewart
commented:
In today's society, it constitutes far too gross an
oversimplification to assume that every single Negro,
Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and
Aleut potentially interested in construction contracting
currently suffers from the effects of past or present racial
discrimination. Since the MBE set-aside must be viewed
as resting upon such an assumption, it necessarily paints
with too broad a brush. Except to make whole the
identified victims of racial discrimination, the guarantee
of equal protection prohibits the government from taking
detrimental action against innocent people on the basis of
the sins of others of their own race.34
Justice Stevens was specifically critical of the way
Congress had approached the problem:
The statutory definition of the preferred class includes
"citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." All
aliens and all nonmembers of the racial class are
excluded. No economic, social, geographical or historical
criteria are relevant for exclusion or inclusion. There is
not one word in the remainder of the Act or in the
legislative history that explains why any Congressman or
Senator favored this particular definition over any other
or that identifies the common characteristics that every
member of the preferred class was believed to share. Nor
does the Act or its history explain why 10% of the total
appropriation was the proper amount to set aside for
33. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding the use of racial and ethnic
classifications in the Public Works Employment Act of 1976).
34. Id. at 530.
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investors in each of the six racial subclasses.35
It was not until City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson" in
1989, that a majority of the Supreme Court adopted the
position that the Constitution required justification fbr the
inclusion of each separate group granted preferences.37
Justice O'Connor wrote:
The random inclusion of racial groups, that, as a practical
matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in
the construction industry in Richmond suggests that
perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past
discrimination .... The gross overinclusiveness of
Richmond's racial preferences strongly impugns the city's
claim of remedial motivation.8
The Court noted that Richmond's adoption of the federal
group categories for presumptive eligibility created a
situation in which "There is absolutely no evidence of past
discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond
construction industry .... It may well be that Richmond has
never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen." 9
After the Supreme Court's decisions in City of Richmond
v. Croson and Adarand v. Pena, any governmental use of
racial or ethnic classifications must be based in a factual
identification of the particular discrimination against the
groups favored. As the Supreme Court declared in Adarand:
"All racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state,
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental
35. Id.
36. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
37. See id. at 506. Earlier Justice Powell, who cast the decisive vote in
Bakke, was concerned that "the University [was] unable to explain its selection
of only four favored groups - Negroes, Mexican-Americans, American Indians
and Asians - for special treatment. The inclusion of the last group [was]
especially curious in the light of the substantial numbers of Asians admitted
through the regular admissions process." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
38. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
39. Id.
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interests."'
A number of lower courts have applied the strict scrutiny
standard to racial and ethnic classifications in cases involving
local public contracting where the groups in the affirmative
action program showed it was not narrowly tailored.4' In
1991 in Milwaukee County Pavers Association v. Fielder.42 a
pre-Adarand case, the Seventh Circuit upheld the use of
racial classifications in the federal portions of a highway
program, but struck down the use of these classifications
where local funds were used.48 Circuit Judge Richard Posner
stated regarding presumptive eligibility:
To trigger the presumption of disadvantage in the
Wisconsin state programs, a subcontractor need only
establish that 51 percent of its owners fall into one of four
racial-ethnic groups (black, Hispanic, Asian, American
Indian) or is a woman. Anyone who is not a member of
one of these groups must prove that he is socially and
economically disadvantaged in fact. The presumption can
be rebutted, but given the difficulty of establishing
whether a particular individual is socially and
economically disadvantaged the availability of the
presumption is likely to be decisive. This means that the
state is conferring a significant benefit - access to a
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
41. See Contractors Assoc. of E. Pa. v. Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3rd Cir.
1993) (in which the Third Circuit found no basis in evidence for extending
preferences to firms owned by Asian Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans,
and women, while preserving for trial the issue of discrimination against
African American owned firms). Also see Prior Tire v. Atlanta Pub. Schs.,
Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Civ. No.
1:95-CV-825-JEC (N.D. Ga.), where the federal district court struck down the
public contracting program for Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans,
and women-owned firms and preserved for trial African American-owned firms
declaring: "[Tihe Court is required by Croson to examine under the strict
scrutiny standard the inclusion of each minority group in the affirmative action
plan." Id. at 27. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit made separate evaluations of
preferences for Hispanic, African American, and women-owned firms, the three
groups given preferences in Dade County's public contracting program, before
ruling the preferences in construction unconstitutional. Engineering
Contractors of S. Fla. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir.
1997). See also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), where the court
declared, "A broad program that sweeps in all minorities with a remedy that is
in no way related to past harms cannot survive constitutional scrutiny." Id. at
951.
42. 922 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1991).
43. See id.
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presumption of social and economic disadvantage that is
the key to a valuable entitlement - on grounds that
Croson forbids a state to use without establishing that the
purpose is to rectify discrimination. The state can if it
wants redistribute wealth in favor of the disadvantaged,
but it cannot get out from under Croson by pronouncing
entire racial and ethnic groups to be disadvantaged. The
whole point of Croson is that disadvantage, diversity, or
other grounds for favoring minorities will not justify
governmental racial discrimination other than by the
federal government; only a purpose of remedying
discrimination against minorities will do so."
After Adarand, courts have criticized presumptive
eligibility in evaluating federal programs. On remand in
Adarand v. Pena, the district court ruled, "I find it difficult to
envisage a race based classification that is narrowly tailored.
By it's [sic] very nature, such a program is both
underinclusive and overinclusive. This seemingly
contradictory result suggests that the criteria are lacking in
substance as well as in reason."'
The statutes and regulations governing the
Subcontracting Compensation Clause ("SCC") program are
overinclusive in that they presume that all those in the
named minority groups are economically and in some acts
and regulations, socially disadvantaged. The presumption is
false, as is its corollary, namely that the majority
(Caucasians) as well as members of other (unlisted) minority
groups are not socially and/or economically disadvantaged.
By excluding certain minority groups whose members are
economically and socially disadvantaged due to past and
present discrimination, the SCC program is underinclusive."
In Houston Contractors Association v. Houston Metro,47
the court, commenting on the concept of presumptive
44. Id. at 422.
45. 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (1997).
46. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D.
Colo. 1997). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found the constitutional challenge to
the SCC moot since Adarand Constructors had been subsequently granted DBE
status by the state of Colorado. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169
F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit decision was vacated and
remanded in a per curiam decision by the Supreme Court. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000).
47. 945 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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eligibility used in the administration of federal transit funds
by the Metro Transit Authority which was following federal
regulations, declared:
Like all distinctions based on race and sex, Metro's
classification of disadvantaged business enterprises is a
blunt instrument. It is both over- and under-inclusive.
The program designates groups and defines control and
ownership, fixing the groups who win and lose in its
allocation of public resources. The judiciary reviews
distinctions by race and sex meticulously because none of
them has been found to have a rational basis, except in
political preference and social convention. The eradication
of barriers is a noble goal, but it will not be achieved by
creating new barriers."
The court concluded:
While it is true that statistically members of these groups
are more likely to be unable to participate fully in the
economy because they suffer from the effects of past
discrimination, Metro presumes that all bidders associated
with "disadvantaged" groups are actually disadvantaged.
Legislative presumptions are at best a convenience and at
worst a cloak. 9
In 1998, a third federal district court found that the
concept of presumptive eligibility and the long list of groups
entitled to that presumption failed the narrow tailoring test.
In In re Sherbrooke Sodding Co.,50 the plaintiffs argued that
the inclusion of almost all non-white people did not reflect a
"narrow tailored" focus to the DBE program. The district
court agreed and quoted the Supreme Court language in
Croson criticizing Richmond's "random inclusion of racial
groups"5' in its MBE program, "that as a practical matter may
48. Id. at 1018.
49. Id. The court permanently enjoined the use of race and ethnic
classifications for anything other than reporting purposes in Metro's federally
financed transportation programs. This decision was reversed and remanded
by the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the contractors had not proved
damages and that to the extent federal funds were involved, the federal
government should have been permitted to intervene. See Houston Contractors
Ass'n. v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15100 (5th Cir.
1999).
50. 17 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Minn. 1998).
51. Id. at 1037.
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never have suffered discrimination."' The district court then
concluded that the federal government defendants "have been
singularly unable to demonstrate the connection between
those individuals upon which DBE status has been conferred
by the Congress and the regulations, and any present or past
discrimination against the races or gender of those
individuals.""
Criticism of the federal list of presumptively eligible
groups has continued to appear when that list has been used
to define eligibility in state and local programs. In Drabik v.
Ohio,5" the federal district court, in striking down the state of
Ohio MBE program as applied to construction, endorsed the
state trial judge's opinion about the arbitrary nature of the
definitions of presumptive eligibility as applied to Asians.
Noting that Asian Indians and Pakistanis were eligible but
many other Asians were not, the court quoted the trial judge:
The Court can think of few things more repugnant to our
constitutional system of governments than the
construction of a statue that would exclude a group of
United States' [sic] citizens and residents of Ohio from a
State program, the sole criteria for exclusion being the
side of the river, a mountain range or a desert their
ancestors decided to settle. 55
In Association for Fairness in Business, Inc. v. New
Jersey,5" the federal court faulted the state's dependence on
the federal presumptively eligible list noting that the court
had not been presented with any evidence that "qualified
Hawaiian-owned and native Alaskan-owned contractors even
exist in New Jersey, let alone that these minority-businesses
are discriminated against by casino licensees in the purchase
52. Id.
53. Id. Sherbrooke was appealed to the Eighth Circuit which returned the
case to the district court to address changes implemented by the Department of
Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program. These regulatory
changes appeared in 64 Fed. Reg. 5,097-5,148 (1998). The district court
dismissed the appeal, however, on grounds that its decision was based on the
program prior to the regulatory changes and that it would not issue an advisory
opinion regarding the new program. In re Sherbrooke Sodding Co., No. 6-96-
CV-41 (JMR) (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 1999).
54. 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000).
55. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741, 770 (S.D.
Ohio 1999), affd 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000).
56. 82 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.J. 2000).
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of goods and services. " ' Moreover, the court criticized the
concept that once a group was on the list, it was given
equivalent status with the other eligible groups even though
its history of discrimination and size might be entirely
different. The court criticized setting a single 15% goal as
over-inclusive because the program does not "differentiate
between the discrimination experienced by minority group
businesses and women owned businesses," 8 and "allows
casino licensees to satisfy the set-aside program's goals in a
way that could bestow a windfall of remedial benefits on one
group while depriving another group of any such benefit." 9 A
casino licensee "could meet its obligation by contracting with
a Hawaiian-owned company even though there was no
evidence of discrimination against such businesses" ° and
stated, "... a program that allows such a result is clearly not
narrowly tailored."6
The most recent case to comment on presumptive
eligibility is Concrete Works v. City and County of Denver.6
In striking down the Denver MWBE contracting program, the
judge said:
The most fundamental flaw in this effort to support
Denver's preferential use of race, ethnicity and gender by
statistical evidence is that no objective criteria define who
is entitled to the benefits of the program and who is
excluded from those benefits. Presumptive eligibility for
preferential treatment through certification as MBEs is
given to those identifying themselves as African
Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans and Native
Americans.6
Denver's definitions of those groups was taken verbatim
from the federal definitions, but the court complained: "One
group is defined by race [African American], another by
culture [Hispanic], another by country of origin [Asian
American] and another by blood [Native American].... The
57. Id. at 360.
58. Id. at 362.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Association for Fairness in Bus., Inc. v. New Jersey, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353,
362 (S.D.N.J. 2000).
62. 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Colo. 2000).
63. Id. at 1068.
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aggregation of them as equally victimized by discrimination
and equally entitled to preferential remedies is particularly
problematic for Fourteenth Amendment equality analysis."64
Though there seems to be a clear legal trend of
skepticism regarding the federal list of presumptively eligible
minority groups in these opinions,65 no appellate court has
ruled on whether the federal list of racial and ethnic groups
entitling owners to the presumption of social and economic
disadvantage meets either the compelling interest or narrow
tailoring test.
III. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PRESUMPTIVE ELIGIBILITY
Discovery in recent federal cases have demonstrated that
relevant SBA officials did not remember and could not
reconstruct the criteria or standards used to determine which
groups were considered socially and economically
disadvantaged for the purposes of granting presumptive
eligibility to business owners and which were not.66 In a
deposition for the McCrossan Construction Company v.
Cook,67 the SBA official, who the government identified as
knowledgeable about the origins of presumptive eligibility,
conceded it would be sheer speculation as to the criteria his
agency used in the past.68 Since it appears the SBA has
64. Id. at 1069 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506
(1989). Though decided on Fifteenth Amendment grounds, the Supreme Court
in Rice v. Cayetano, 145 L.Ed. 2d 1007 (2000), struck down a preference for
Native Hawaiians, a group defined identically in voting preference disallowed
as in federal contracting preferences. Id. In Justice Breyer's concurrence, joined
by Justice Souter, he questioned the blood quantum aspect of the Native
Hawaiian definition, which includes, "anyone with one ancestor who lived in
Hawaii prior to 1778, thereby including individuals who are less than one five-
hundredth original Hawaiian [which] . . . goes well beyond any reasonable
limit." Id. at 1061-62.
65. The single exception is Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 49 F.
Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999), where the court held the plaintiffs had offered
"no evidence that Asian-Americans have not been discriminated against in the
award of government contracts," and, unlike Croson and other cases, there was
no issue of whether various minorities actually lived in the jurisdiction creating
the program. Id. at 996-97. The case is on appeal to the federal circuit court of
appeals.
66. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
67. No. Civ. 95-1345-HB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721 (D.N.M. 1996).
68. Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 64-65 (Mar. 18, 1996), C.S. McCrossan
Constr. Co. v. Cook, No. Civ. 95-1345-HB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721 (D.N.M.
1996).
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developed institutional amnesia on these issues, it is useful to
try to reconstruct the history of presumptive eligibility.
The SBA was created in 1953 to "aid, counsel, assist, and
protect, insofar as is possible, the interest of small-business
concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise. " "
For the first fifteen years of its existence, the SBA focused on
assisting all small businesses, regardless of the race or
ethnicity of the owner. The SBA operates by creating
agreements with other federal agencies which then contract
with small businesses which supply the services or materials.
After the Kerner Commission's 1967 report examining
the urban riots of the preceding year, the SBA made an
important change in its race-neutral policies. The
Commission concluded that "special encouragement" was
needed to guide blacks into the economic mainstream, 71 so the
SBA decided administratively to construe its Section 8(a)
authority to establish set-asides for small businesses owned
by "socially or economically disadvantaged" individuals.2
The term "disadvantaged" remained formally undefined
until 1973 when the SBA published in the Federal Register a
list of five groups "presumed" to be socially or economically
disadvantaged: "blacks, American Indians, Spanish-
Americans, Asian-Americans, and Puerto Ricans."73 There
were no hearings or formal findings and the announcement
did not explain why the SBA had gone beyond the "special
encouragement" of blacks recommended by the Kerner
Commission to grant preferential status to other groups. Nor
was there any explanation as to why these particular groups
had been included.
In 1978, Congress passed the Small Business Investment
Act,74 providing a statutory basis to what had been for a
decade a purely administratively based 8(a) program and
generating a three track system for participation in set-
asides. In the first track were small businesses owned by
69. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1971).
70. See REPORT ON THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (Bantam Books 1968).
71. See id. at 424.
72. See Shelly Green & Paul Pryde, BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AMERICA
42 (1990).
73. 13 C.F.R. 124.8(c) (1973).
74. Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757-73 (1978).
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individuals identifying with designated groups (blacks,
Hispanics, and Native Americans) who were considered
presumptively "socially and economically disadvantaged."75
The Act defined socially disadvantaged individuals "as those
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or
cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group
without regard to their individual qualities."" "Economically
disadvantaged individuals" were defined as "those socially
disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the
free enterprise system has been impaired.., as compared to
others in the same business area who are not socially
disadvantaged."77 In the second track, persons not from a
presumptively disadvantaged group had to go through a
rigorous process to individually prove they were
"disadvantaged because of discrimination."78 In the third
track were businesses owned by members of groups who




78. Id. Even under the current regulations which require that individuals
prove their social disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence rather than
the clear and convincing evidence standard, individuals not from designated
racial and ethnic groups must prove they have personally suffered social
disadvantage based on at least one objective factor and they must attach a
"specific" and "detailed" narrative where each statement of alleged
discrimination
should be supported by documented evidence such as affidavits, denials
of loan applications, denials of employment opportunities (including
non-selection for particular jobs, denials of promotions, or unequal
work environments or treatment), and documents to support any
formal action taken by you because of the alleged discrimination. You
must demonstrate how your identification as described in the
paragraph stated above, has negatively impacted on your entry into or
advancement in the business.
SDB application, Section B at 3.
Individuals from non-designated groups must also demonstrate economic
disadvantage by
document[ing] how [their] ability to compete in the free enterprise
system has been impaired by such things as inability to obtain
adequate bonding, credit or financing; inability to obtain licenses or
leases; restrictions of [their] markets to certain racial, ethnic or social
groups; underemployment or unemployment, etc., as compared to
others in the same or similar line of business who are not socially
disadvantaged.
Id. at 4. Persons identifying with SBA designated groups need only check a box
indicating that designation.
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entire group.
Groups petitioning for 8(a) presumptively eligible status
were theoretically evaluated by the SBA on several measures.
Petitioners had to make an "adequate showing" that the
group had suffered racial, ethnic, or cultural bias by
demonstrating:
(1) The group has suffered the effects of prejudice, bias, or
discriminatory practices;
(2) Such conditions have resulted in economic deprivation
for the group of the type which Congress has found exists
for the groups named in P. L. 95-507, and
(3) Such conditions have produced impediments in the
business world for members of the group over which they
have no control and which are not common to all small
79business owners.
As this article will show, no consistent standards were
applied by the SBA in making the presumptively eligible
group decisions.
In addition to eligibility for 8(a) set-aside contracts,
groups were motivated to seek inclusion in the SBA's list of
designated groups because that list was copied in other
affirmative action programs around the country.0 The SBA's
selection of a group influenced acceptance into other federal
affirmative action programs, hundreds of state and local
programs, and even private sector programs, such as those
voluntarily established by corporations and universities.81
It was the clear Congressional intent that the SBA not
confine 8(a) benefits solely to the groups listed by Pub. L. No.
95-507. The House Committee report accompanying the new
law stated "[t]here is sufficient discretion ... to allow SBA to
79. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(d)(2)(i-iii).
80. See, for example, the groups awarded preferences in the cities of
Richmond and Denver, and by the states of California, Ohio, and New Jersey.
See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989); Concrete Works of
Denver, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1068 (D. Colo.
2000); Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1998);
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741, 770 (S.D. Ohio) affd
214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); Association for Fairness in Bus. v. New Jersey, 82
F. Supp. 2d 353, 360 (S.D.N.J. 2000).
81. See George R. La Noue, Split Visions: Minority Business Set-Asides, 523
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
104 (Sept. 1992).
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designate any other additional minority group or persons it
believes should be afforded the presumption of social and
economic disadvantage."82 The final Conference Committee
report specifically referred to a "poor Appalachian white
person" as an example of cultural bias that might justify
inclusion. 3 Since Congress had neither the political will nor
the information to draw clear-cut lines of inclusion/exclusion,
it delegated the task to the administrative agency.
The SBA expressed the breadth of its legislative mandate
in the following policy memo entitled, "Meaning of Socially or
Economically Disadvantaged:"
Except to recommend the elimination of any suggestion
that only members of minority groups are eligible for
assistance under this program and to specify that the
program is to aid all who are hampered in achieving full
citizenship in our economic system by virtue of their social
or economic disadvantages, Congress has not fully defined
the words "socially or economically disadvantaged." This
lack of precise legislative definition suggests that a precise
definition is inappropriate, and that flexibility is
warranted....
In determining whether the owners of small business
concerns are "disadvantaged," consideration may be given
to the following factors:
(a) low income;
(b) unfavorable location such as urban ghettos or
depressed rural areas and areas of high
unemployment or under-employment;
(c) limited education;
(d) physical or other special handicap;
(e) inability to compete effectively in the marketplace
because of prevailing or past restrictive practices; and
(f) Vietnam era service in the Armed Forces, (August
5, 1964 to May 7, 1975),
or such other factors as contribute to a disadvantaged
82. H.R. REP. No. 95-949, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SMALL
BusINEss ACT AND SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT ACT OF 1958, Amendment,
vol. 1, Comm. Print at 56 (1978).
83. Legislative History, Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757-73, at 3882 (1978).
123
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
condition in the ordinary (dictionary) meaning of that
word: lacking in basic resources or conditions necessary
to achieve an equal position in society.8
A test of the SBA's authority regarding group status
came almost immediately. In the Pub. L. No. 95-507
reformulation of the definition of the groups presumptively
eligible for the 8(a) program, Congress specifically left out
Asians Americans or as they were then called "Orientals." It
is not certain why this occurred. The law was a product of
efforts by the Congressional Black Caucus and blacks were
not enamored by the inclusion of other groups in MBE
programs. Eugene Baker, the president of the National
Association of Black Manufacturers which represented more
than half of the manufacturing and service firms receiving
8(a) contracts at that time, testified:
The only true claim to being socially and economically
disadvantaged can be expressed by those Americans who
did not come to this country seeking the "American
dream." That excludes all but Black Americans, who were
brought in chains and bondage, and the Native
Americans, who were here when this country was
"discovered."8 5
As will be demonstrated later, there are good reasons not
to make a blanket inclusion of Asian Americans among the
socially and economically disadvantaged groups, but
Congress did not publicly debate the issue. Congressman
Parren Mitchell, the leader of the Black Caucus and the
principal advocate of federal MBE programs, never
mentioned the original exclusion of Asian Americans or
engaged in any discussion of which groups should be included
in his account of the birth of these programs.86 Nor do the
other historical accounts of federal MBE programs discuss
this issue."
84. Determination of "Disadvantaged Small Business Concern," 2017 SBA
POLICY AND PROCEDURAL RELEASE pt. IV-V (1980).
85. Testimony Before the House Committee on Small Businesses,
Subcommittee on General Oversight and Minority Enterprise Task Force on
Minority Enterprise, 96th Cong. 21 (1979).
86. See Parren J. Mitchell, Federal Affirmative Action for MBE's: A
Historical Analysis, IX NAT'L BAR ASSOC. L.J. 1.
87. See Jess H. Drabkin, Minority Enterprise Development and the Small
Business Administration's Section 8(a) Program: Constitutional Basis and
124 [Vol. 41
2000] FEDERAL PROCUREMENT PREFERENCES
The procedure the SBA had created to consider whether
additional groups should be presumptively included did not
satisfy Asian American interest groups who began to
pressure the agency and Congress to include them in the
immediately presumptive category. Diane Wong, executive
director of the Washington State Commission on Asian
American Affairs, wrote:
The people in Senator Matsunaga's office have informed
me that several federal agencies are watching the
progress of SBA regulations [regarding exclusion of
Asian/Pacific Americans] very closely. If SBA can succeed
then it is highly likely that they will try to follow suit.
Thus, it is extremely important that we nip this in the
bud.&
The offensive quickly began to have an impact. On May
22, 1979, Congressman Norman Mineta (Dem. Cal.) proposed
an amendment giving Asian Pacific Americans automatic
qualification as a "socially disadvantaged group" to a bill
providing low-interest disaster loans for small businesses.89
Congressman Mineta pointed out that most Asian businesses
were small with receipts of less than $25,000 and fewer than
five employees. No comparisons were made to other groups,
even though most businesses owned by any ethnic group in
the United States were small and had few employees.
Congressman Robert Matsui (Dem. Cal.) joined in and
Regulatory Implementation, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 433 (1983) (avoiding the group
issue); Gary Lee Hopkins, Contracting with the Disadvantaged, Sec. 8(a) and
the Small Business Administration, 7 PUB. CONT. L.J. 169 (1975) (criticizing the
use of racial and ethnic classifications in 8(a) but failing to comment on the
inclusion of particular groups). The most definitive study of federal MBE
programs mentions the specific exclusion of Hasidic Jews, but otherwise does
not comment on the inclusion/exclusion issue. See Daniel Levinson, A Study of
Preferential Treatment: Evolution of Minority Business Enterprise Assistance
Program, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980).
88. Letter from Diane Wong, Executive Director of the Washington State
Commission on Asian-American Affairs, to Louis Hayaska (June 20, 1979)
reprinted in COMPETING IN THE MARKETPLACE: A LOOK AT MINORITY BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON ADVISORY
COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (December
1979).
89. See COMPETING IN THE MARKETPLACE: A LOOK AT MINORITY BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON ADVISORY
COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (December
1979).
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explained that:
Absent immediate congressional intervention Asian
Pacific Americans will be confronted with the arduous
task of proceeding through the regulatory process to
convince the Small Business Administration of the need
for designation as a presumptively qualified minority
group. This regulatory burden, coupled with time delays
and preparation costs, is simply unfair and it violates the
Congressional intent that this program be implemented
expeditiously."
No one wished to debate the matter so Congress accepted
the Amendment without a vote.
Before the Senate could act, however, the SBA
announced on June 27, 1979, that it would make its own
determination on the matter. Six working days later, on July
6, the SBA decided that certain groups of Asian Pacific
Americans were socially disadvantaged and therefore
presumptively 8(a) eligible. The groups were U.S. citizens
from: Japan, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea, Samoa,
Guam, the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific, Northern
Marianas, Laos,9 Cambodia, and Taiwan.
But what of other Asians or other groups that thought of
themselves as socially and economically disadvantaged?
They would have to petition group-by-group. Between 1979
and 1989, the SBA considered eight groups. The result was
that petitions from Hasidic Jews [1980], women [19821,
service disabled veterans [1987] and Iranians [1989] were
rejected, while petitions from Asian Indians [1982], and Sri
Lankans [1988] were accepted. The SBA originally rejected
Tongans and Indonesians but later accepted them in 1989. In
a decade those groups presumptively eligible for preferences
in federal business programs underwent considerable
expansion. Table A indicates this progression. Groups added
are underlined, groups deleted or rejected are in parenthesis
and nomenclature changes are indicated in italics.
90. Id. at 7.
91. To illustrate how haphazard the process was, in August 1989, the SBA
had to reinstate Laos as an Asian-Pacific country since it had been
inadvertently deleted five months earlier. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,692, 34,717 (1989)
(codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 124).
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Table A
Chronology of Groups Presumptively Eligible for MBE
Preference
Source Date Changes to CommentGroups
President 10/13/71 Negroes, Puerto Possibly the earliest
Nixon's Ricans, Spanish- listing of groups.
Exec. speaking Americans,
Order No. American Indians, Superseded E.O.
11,625 Eskimos, Aleuts 11,458, which did
not list any groups.
38 Fed. 5/25/73 Black Americans, The SBA's first
Reg. 13,729 American Indians, listing. Earlier
Spanish-Americans, regulations simply




Pub. L. 95- 5/13/77 Negroes, Spanish- Parren Mitchell's
98, Public speaking, Orientals, Amendment which
Works Indians set aside 10% of a $4
Employ- billion Public Works
ment Act Employment Act
(PWEA) for the
listed groups.
Pub. L. 95- 10/24/78 Black Americans, Congress passed
507, Hispanic Americans, this law to reform
Amend- Native Americans the 8(a) program;
ments to including Indians, Asian-Americans
Small Eskimos, Aleuts were left out.
Business
Act
44 Fed. 5/29/79 Hawaiians Added Hawaiians to
Reg. 30,673 Native Americans.
SBA ruling 7/6/79 Asian Pacific The SBA interim
Americans from rule which, for the
Japan, China, first time, defined
Philippines, Vietnam, an entire group -
Korea, Samoa, Guam, Asian Pacific





SBA 45 4/9/80 (Hasidic Jews) Decision to reject
Fed. Reg. Hasidic Jews based
42,832 on First
Amendment.
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Source Date Changes to CommentSorcDt Groups
Pub. L. 96- 7/2/80 Asian Pacific Legislative approval
302, Small Americans to the groups
Business administratively
Admin. Act added by the SBA.
of 1980




group to the broader
class of women.




SBA ruling 11/3/86 (Tongans) Tonans In first ruling,
1989 Tongans had not
made a case. They
were added in 1989.
SBA ruling 12/16/87 (Disabled Veterans) Prejudice against
disabled veterans
was caused by their
handicaps, not
veterans' status.




in March 1989 as
part of Asian Pacific
expansion.
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SBA 54 8/21/89 Asian Pacific Reinstated Laos,
Fed. Reg. Americans: which had been
34,717 Cambodia inadvertently
(Kampuchea), Macao deleted; added eight






The historical record shows some very active lobbying
and the intervention of prominent members of Congress and
the Carter White House for and against certain groups.9 2
What it does not show is any principled basis for decision-
92. The unpublished documents related to SBA decisions regarding the
petitions of particular groups were obtained through a Freedom of Information
Act request and are in the possession of the Project on Civil Rights and Public
Contracts at the University of Maryland Baltimore County. For an article
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making or use of any objective data to determine which
groups should be on the presumptively eligible list and which
should be excluded. Some groups included on the list are at
the socio-economic bottom of our society, while others,
measured by income, education, and business formation rates
are at the top. Facts about specific group socio-economic
characteristics were irrelevant to the SBA's decision.
IV. SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
In their petition to the SBA, some Asian groups and
other groups attempted to make an argument for relative
socio-economic deprivation. Was that a correct appraisal? In
simple terms, there was a higher proportion of Asian
Americans living in households with incomes over $100,000
(25.0%) than non-Hispanic whites (22.1%) (the non-
presumptively eligible category).93 However, there are other
indicators of socio-economic status that should have been
examined as well, and it is possible to examine these
indicators for various Asian American ethnic groups.
Table B shows the relative educational and income
rankings of various Asian American groups during the period
the SBA was making decisions about groups entitled to
presumptive eligibility. No single measure was
comprehensive, but since preferential treatment was
intended to redistribute educational and economic benefits,
the most appropriate data are from those areas.
93. See Timothy Bates, An Analysis of Korean Immigrant-Owned Small
Business Start-Ups with Comparisons to African-American and Non-Minority
Owned Firms, 30 URB. AFF. Q. 227, 245 (1994) (citing Timothy Bates & C.
Dunham, Facilitating Upward Mobility Through Small Business Ownership, in
URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND INDIVIDUAL OPPORTUNITY 239 (G. Peterson and
W. Vroman eds., Urban Institute, 1992)).
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Table B
Characteristics of Asian Americans by Origin: 1980
% % % Relative %who do Poverty
college managers unem- median not rate f
gradsa / profes- ployed, family speak
sionalsb incomed English
welle
Americans 16.2 22.7 6.5 1.0 NA 9.6
Asian 34.3 29.7 4.6 1.19 15 10.3
Americans
Pacific 9.3 15.6 7.3 .90 NA 16.1
Islanders
Chinese 36.6 32.6 3.6 1.13 23 10.5
Filipino 37.0 25.1 4.8 1.19 6 6.2
Japanese 26.4 28.5 3.0 1.37 9 4.2
Asian Indian 51.9 48.5 5.8 1.25 5 10.6
Korean 33.7 24.9 5.7 1.03 24 12.5
Vietnamese 12.9 13.4 8.2 .65 38 33.5
Laotian 5.9 7.6 15.3 .26 69 67.2
Thai 32.3 23.4 5.5 .97 12 13.4
Cambodian 7.7 10.8 10.6 .45 59 46.9
Hmong 2.9 9.4 20.0 .26 63 65.5
Pakistani 58.4 45.2 5.7 1.08 10 10.5
Indonesian 33.3 24.2 6.1 1.06 6 15.2
Source: "Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s,"
Washington D.C.: U.S. Civil Rights Commission, February, 1992, at 12-13.
a. Percentage of all persons age 25 and over who have completed
4 or more years of college.
b. Percentage of employed persons age 16 and over whose
occupation is in a managerial or professional specialty.
c. Unemployed rate for persons age 16 and over.
d. Median family income as a fraction of the median family
income for the entire U.S. population.
e. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, We, the Asian and Pacific
Islander Americans, p. 11, table 7, and U.S. General Accounting
Office, Asian Americans: A Status Report, p. 44, table 6.1.
f. Percentage of families with income below the poverty level.
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As Table B shows, the Asian American groups entitled to
the presumption of disadvantage are in fact very diverse.
Some groups (Asian Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, and
Japanese) have substantial human capital in terms of income
and managerial status and have achieved good incomes with
low unemployment rates, while other groups who have come
largely as recent refugees (Cambodians, Hmong, and
Laotians) have language deficits, lower incomes, and higher
unemployment. Table B demonstrates that Asian Americans
should not be thought of as a single socio-economic group for
affirmative action reasons. Furthermore, they are not a
single group in terms of language, religion, and culture, or in
terms of their historical experiences or the nature of their
entrance into the United States. Creating the single label
"Asian-Americans" for this diverse group is really a political
artifice rather than a reflection of economic, social, or cultural
realities .94
Asian Americans do not appear generally disadvantaged
when business formation rates are measured. Logically,
business formation rates by race and ethnic group might have
been relevant data for the SBA's decision to exclude or
include various groups from the 8(a) program, particularly
since 8(a) is conceptualized as a business development
program. Table C displays this data from the 1980 census,
the most relevant data for the period in which the decisions
about Asian American groups were made.
94. See Houston Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 993 F.
Supp. 545, 552 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (The court found that "[e]thnic labels are as
arbitrary as racial ones. Under the current census category of 'Asian' you find
lumped together a Catholic Hispanic from Manila and a Hindu from Bombay,
both of whom are Caucasian and each of whom has entirely different social
histories.").
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Table C
Business Participation Rates of Selected Ethnic Groups
Ancestry Business Mean Income
Group Formation per from All Sources





U.S. Average 48.9 $18,630
Cubans 47.9 $17,310
Filipinos 22.4 $27,800





Puerto Ricans 10.6 $11,490
The SBA was aware of these statistics because the
information was compiled by the Office of Advocacy, Research
and Information of the Minority Business Development
Agency (MBDA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce in
1985. The study authors conceded:
These data suggest that many of the groups MBDA has
traditionally served continue to need assistance because
they remain markedly below the national average in
business participation. However, other groups served by
the agency have [rates] near or above average Asian
Indians 47.1, Cubans 47.9, Chinese 60.2, Japanese 64.8,
and Koreans 69.2. 95
95. FRANK A. FRATOE AND RONALD L. MEEKS, BUSINESS PARTICIPATION
RATES OF THE 50 LARGEST U.S. ANCESTRY GROUPS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT,
Research Div., Office of Advocacy, Research & Information, Minority Business
Dev. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, June 1985.
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Dr. Timothy Bates, a scholar who has compared the
status of minority-owned firms has concluded:
From a policy standpoint, an essential factor stands out:
Self-employed Asians are not a disadvantaged group: their
eligibility for government minority business set-aside and
preferential procurement programs, financial assistance,
subsidized technical assistance, and so forth is completely
inappropriate. Their status as a "disadvantaged minority
group" is history and it is time to adjust public policy to
reflect this new reality.9r
The MBDA statistics were based on raw census data, but
more recently social scientists have completed research using
regression analysis to control the many relevant variables.
Some of the results of the research developed by Professors
Robert Fairlie and Bruce Meyer are printed in Table D.
96. Timothy Bates, The Changing Nature of Minority Business: A
Comparative Analysis of Asian, Non-Minority and Black-Owned Businesses, 18
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 25, 26 (1989).
97. See Robert W. Fairlie & Bruce D. Meyer, Ethnic and Racial Self-
Employment Differences and Possible Explanations, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 757
(1996).
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Table D
Regression-adjusted Business Formation Rates by Ethnicity
and Race (males) 1990 Census 98







































Other S. Asians 4.8
African American 4.5
Black C. American 4.5
Black S. American 4.3
Puerto Rican 4.0
Laotian 2.6
As the Fairlie-Meyer data show, there are major
differences in business formation rates among ethnic groups.
The SBA definition of presumptively eligible groups is both
98. See id. at 772-73.
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over and under-inclusive. While all African American groups
are below the mean of 10.8 self-employed persons per
hundred adult male workers, several important Asian
American groups (Chinese and Japanese) are near the mean,
Koreans are substantially above, and Laotians are at the
bottom. Hispanics, Cubans, and white South Americans are
above the mean, while Central Americans and Mexicans are
considerably below. 99
Within the non-presumptively eligible group category,
Armenians, Israelis, Russians, and Greeks are considerably
above the mean, while Poles and French-Canadians are
below. Between 1980 and 1990, the largest growth in self-
employment for men occurred among Vietnamese (148%),
Caribbean Spanish (88%), Slovaks (70%), and Laotian (67%).
If these trends continue, the 2000 census will make the SBA's
previous presumptions about social and economic conditions
even less a reflection of actual business disadvantage.
Furthermore, no inquiry by the SBA has considered
whether cultural factors, rather than discrimination,
influence business formation decisions. In striking down a
program of racial and ethnic preferences in public
contracting, the Eleventh Circuit declared:
In a pluralistic and diverse society, it is unreasonable to
assume that equality of opportunity will inevitably lead
different groups with similar human and financial capital
characteristics to make similar career choices ....
"Similarly situated" women, men, blacks, whites, Native
Americans, Italian-Americans, and every other group that
might be listed all bring their own values and traditions to
the socio-economic table, and may reasonably be expected
to make voluntary choices that give effect to those values
and traditions. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Croson, the disproportionate attraction of a minority
group to non-construction industries does not mean that
99. This data has recently drawn the attention of courts. In striking down
Denver's MWBE program in part because it was overinclusive, the judge noted:
The studies show that there are major differences between the
business formation rates of different groups and within the same
identified group. The leading group forming businesses in recent years
... has been Korean Americans with formation rates almost twice as
high as Chinese Americans who were exactly at the national average,
and major differences also exist within the Hispanic category and
within the European or white categories.
Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 86 F. Supp.
2d 1042, 1070 (D. Colo. 2000).
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discrimination in the construction industry is the
100
reason.
Drawing the lines based on racial or ethnic group
membership for the purposes of including or excluding
persons as beneficiaries of public programs is one of the most
dangerous powers a government can possess. Political
polarization and group enmity are almost certain results.
That is why the Supreme Court has required strict scrutiny
when racial and ethnic classifications are employed.
V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DEFENSE OF PRESUMPTIVE
ELIGIBILITY
Often the reasons and factual support for legislative and
bureaucratic decisions on controversial matters are difficult
to discern unless the authors wish to make them public. In
this instance, however, the litigation discovery process has
added substantially to the information available.'0 ' Judicial
skepticism about the connection between preferences based
on presumptive eligibility and any findings of discrimination
turns out to be well-founded.
Several depositions of SBA designated 30(b)(6) experts
have been taken as a part of litigation discovery. Mr. Calvin
Jenkins, Associate Director of the SBA, Minority Enterprise
Program, and Mr. William Fisher, Associate Administrator of
the SBA Office of Minority Enterprise Development were
designated by the agency as knowledgeable on the following
topics:
1. General administration of the 8(a) program;
4. Process and criteria for applying the concept of
economic disadvantage;
100. Engineering Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
122 F.3d 895, 922 (lth Cir. 1997). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Columbus, 936
F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
101. This section of the article reflects documents obtained through pre-trial
discovery in three 1998-1999 cases: C.S. McCrossan Constr. Co. v. Cook, No.
CIV. 95-134-HB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721 (D.N.M. Apr. 2, 1996; Rothe Dev.
Corp. v. Dep't of Defense, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999), decision stayed in
194 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1999); and DynAlantic v. Dep't of Defense (D.D.C.).
McCrossan has been dismissed for lack of standing. Rothe received a district
court opinion, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999), that was stayed by the Fifth
Circuit. It is now on appeal to the federal circuit court of appeals. DynAlantic
is awaiting trial.
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5. History and criteria used by the S.B.A. in establishing
the racial or ethnic groups which the S.B.A. has
determined by regulation are entitled to presumptive
"social disadvantage" in the 8(a) program;
6. The standards, procedures, and criteria for rebutting
the ethnic or racial presumption for "social disadvantage"
in the 8(a) program;
7. The process and criteria for applying the concept of
social disadvantage."'
Also, a series of requests for admission were asked of the
Justice Department to clarify the congressional and
administrative record. The only reasonable conclusion from a
review of this material is that either the SBA does not know
why some groups have been included as presumptively
disadvantaged or the agency is being purposely evasive about
the standards used in determining the presumption.
To participate in the Small Business Administration's
8(a) program, the SDB program, or DOT DBE programs, an
individual must be both socially and economically
disadvantaged. But social disadvantage is the initial screen.
As Mr. Fisher, Acting Associate Administrator of the SBA's
Office of Minority Enterprise Development, testified: "You
can't be economically disadvantaged unless you're also
socially disadvantaged."1 °3
Nevertheless, when the SBA made the racial and ethnic
decisions to determine presumptive eligibility, it gathered no
statistical data, sought no uniform measurement of
educational or economic attainment,1 04  commissioned or
completed no studies on the history of discrimination
regarding the groups included, and supplied no consistent
102. Notice of Deposition subpoena to Phillip Lader, Administrator for the
Small Business Administration, or his designee(s), at 2, C.S. McCrossan Constr.
Co. v. Cook, No. Civ. 95-134-HB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721 (D.N.M. Apr. 2,
1996).
103. Deposition of William Fisher at 123 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
104. Most businesses owned by members of any group are small. In 1982,
around the period when the presumptive eligibility decisions were crystallizing,
64% of all businesses owned by white males had net receipts of less than
$25,000, compared to 69% for Hispanics, 70% for blacks, and 65% for other
minorities (mostly Asian). Similarly, 81% of all businesses owned by white
males had no paid employees compared to 84% Hispanic, 87% black, and 81%
other minorities. See Bureau of the Census, 1982 Characteristics of Business
Owners, Table 3b at 12 and Table 4c at 22.
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definition of group eligibility standards. Indeed, the SBA's
designated representatives cannot even remember why some
of these decisions were made.0 5 Whether the SBA's amnesia
is convenient or simply a reflection of the passage of time
about decisions never based on a firm record is ultimately not
relevant. Neither explanation satisfies strict scrutiny.
Presumptive eligibility in the 8(a) program was not
intended as a remedy for any identified pattern or practice of
discrimination in federal contracting. No such record existed.
Nor can the racial classifications in the 8(a) program be
intended to remedy discrimination in any particular industry
since 8(a) contracts potentially cover everything the
government buys. If based on any theory at all, presumptive
eligibility was intended to compensate for societal
discrimination. But that has been an invalid justification for
the use of a racial classification since the Supreme Court
decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,0 6 which
made the distinction between "societal discrimination" (an
inadequate basis for race conscious classifications) and the
type of identified discrimination that can support and define
the scope of race-based relief.0 7
Since Wygant and Croson, the judiciary has become much
more critical of the use of racial classifications in a variety of
settings and has specifically expanded strict scrutiny to
federal programs. 0 8  In Adarand, the Court recalled that
racial classifications were considered "odious," "pernicious"
and constitutionally suspect and can only be justified if their
use passes the strict scrutiny test.'°9  Therefore it is
important to examine whether presumptive eligibility meets
either the compelling interest and narrow tailoring
components of strict scrutiny.
A Compelling Interest
While a program must meet both prongs to pass the
strict scrutiny test, it must first pass the compelling interest
105. See, e.g., Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 72 (Mar. 18, 1996), McCrossan,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721; Deposition of William Fisher at 41 (Mar. 16,
1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
106. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
107. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989).
108. See, e.g., Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga.
1999), affd 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17310 (l1th Cir. July 19, 2000).
109. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214-15, 219.
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test. The Eleventh Circuit recently offered this nautical
metaphor:
The existence of each of the programs, including all of its
component parts, must withstand the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny if that program is to be upheld.
Either a program is grounded on a proper evidentiary
factual predicate or it is not. If it is, then that program
sails on to the next stage of the analysis, where each
component contract measure is tested against the "narrow
tailoring" and "substantial relationship" requirements.
On the other hand, if a program is not grounded on a
proper evidentiary basis, then all of the contract measures
go down with the ship, irrespective of any narrow tailoring
or substantial relationship analysis."o
The Department of Justice has determined that the
federal government has established a general compelling
interest for race conscious procurement programs in its
generic statement, "The Compelling Interest for Affirmative
Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey"'
published as an appendix in the Federal Register.1 12  The
appendix, however, was never approved by Congress
although it purports to reflect Congressional findings. The
appendix does not purport to provide a predicate for any
particular program. Much of what is cited in the appendix is
several decades old or has never actually been considered by
Congress.
13
The Justice Department does not consider these
problems relevant. Instead the Justice Department has
asserted in litigation that: "Further, Congress is not required
to specify what particular factors or matters it considered or
rejected in reaching a decision to fund, enact, or maintain the
110. Engineering Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
122 F.3d 895, 906 (llth Cir. 1997).
111. In In re Sherbrooke Sodding Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1034, the judge
described the Survey as recounting "Congress's debates and examinations of
discrimination and its possible remedies.... Congress has clearly visited this
issue, and has consistently found that effects of discrimination remain."
112. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,050 (1996). See discussion supra Part I for the
chronological sequence of the Department of Justice's post-Adarand
publications.
113. See 61 Fed. Reg. 26,050 (1996). For example, the appendix relies
extensively on local disparity studies and a Department of Justice
commissioned meta-study by the Urban Institute based on these local studies,
but Congress has never held hearings or made any findings on either the local
studies or the Institute's report.
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[8(a)] program at issue."" 4 It is hard to imagine a more
sweeping assertion of federal power than to make rules
preferring one race, ethnicity, or gender over another than
this statement. It is also hard to imagine a clearer challenge
to the judicial role in applying strict scrutiny. If the
Department of Justice assertion is good law, then the
statistical accuracy or legal relevance of Congressional
findings regarding various MBE programs is irrelevant
because Congress need not specify anything before granting
racial preferences. Congress, according to this view, does not
have to specify any particular factors or matters considered
at all. This is not deference to Congress, but abdication,
which the Adarand court described as the "rough
compromises struck by contending groups" in the political
115
process.
The Justice Department's assertion came in response to a
number of requests for admission that various documents
cited in the federal government's survey on compelling
interest were not, in fact, "relied upon by Congress as a basis
for originally enacting the 8(a) program or during any other
re-enactment of the program."11 6 The documents in question
were (1) the Urban Institute report, "Do Minority Businesses
Get a Fair Share of Government Contracts?""' (2) the
disparity studies cited in the survey,1 8 and (3) the social
science evidence cited in the survey." 9 All of these documents
were created after the enactment of the 8(a) program, so the
Justice Department admitted that Congress did not rely on
any of the above documents at that time. Nor did the Justice
Department assert that Congress relied on any of these
documents for actions taken after their publication either, but
responded that the documents "have been available to
Congress since their publication for Congress' consideration
in determining whether to maintain the 8(a) program and
114. Defendants' Response to Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1996), C.S.
McCrossan v. Cook, No. CIV. 95-1345-HB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721 (D.N.M.
April 2, 1996), responses to request Nos. 2-4.
115. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (1995) (quoting Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)).
116. Requests for Admission, McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721,
request No. 3.
117. See id., request No. 2.
118. See id., request No. 3.
119. See id., request No. 4.
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other similar programs." 120 This answer evades the question
of whether Congress relied on any of these documents. It is
hard to think of any document about any subject that would
not be "available" to Congress in considering legislation.
Surely documents "available" to Congress would encompass
anything in the Library of Congress or indeed anything on
the Internet. In its responses, the Justice Department
appeared to deny the importance of any factual basis as a
prerequisite for federal legislation establishing racial or
ethnic preferences.
Nor did the Justice Department, when specifically asked,
claim that the 8(a) program is a response to discrimination by
federal or state procurement officers.12' Nor did the Justice
Department in its admission claim that either Congress or
the Justice Department has ever sought to objectively
validate or substantiate any of the anecdotal claims cited in
the survey.122
In short, the government's position on compelling
interest is that almost anything said in Congressional
hearings or debate or anything consistent with a hypothesis
of discrimination generally in the American economy or any
document that might have been "available" to Congress is
sufficient to establish a compelling interest. But as courts
have found, unless discrimination is specifically identified, no
narrowly tailored remedy is possible.
123
B. Narrow Tailoring
As the Ninth Circuit declared in its en banc affirmation
of Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson:
The Constitutional requirement of "narrow tailoring" is an
120. Id., request Nos. 2, 3a-d, 4.
121. See id., request No. 5.
122. See Requests for Admission, McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721,
request Nos. 27-31.
123. See Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. Watts, 13 F. Supp. 2d. 1308, 1314 (N.D.
Fla. 1998) (The court stated, "An affirmative action program that is not focused
on 'those who discriminate' may well serve the illegitimate purpose of providing
certain racial or ethnic groups with compensation for some ill-defined social
wrong, but it probably will not serve the legitimate purpose of dismantling a
closed business system."). See also Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist.
32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), injunction vacated, remanded for trial,
212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Absent findings of actual discrimination, there is a
danger that a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking
stereotypes or a form of racial politics.") (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 510).
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instrument of justice, not a mere technicality. It has been
a delicate affair for the courts to reconcile the principle
that each individual is entitled to equal protection of the
laws, with the principle that persons in groups that have
been discriminated against deserve a leg up in order to
have equal opportunity. Past discrimination sometime,
somewhere is not enough. Many of us are of peoples who
have suffered oppression, some recently some long ago,
some in America, some in foreign lands.
12
If the concept of presumptive eligibility can ever be
narrowly tailored as the basis for preferential procurement
policy, it must be limited to groups that have been identified
as victims of relevant discrimination: assertions of general
societal discrimination are not sufficient. The Ninth Circuit
has recently summarized the law:
For a racial classification to survive strict scrutiny in the
context before us, it must be a narrowly tailored remedy
for past discrimination, active or passive, committed by
the governmental entity making the classification. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct.706, 716, 720
(1989). "Findings of societal discrimination will not
suffice; the findings must concern prior discrimination by
the government unit involved."'25
Since the Justice Department's post-Adarand documents
on procurement and the new regulations for federal MBE
programs avoid discussing the narrow tailoring issue of why
certain groups are presumed socially disadvantaged while
others are not, it is useful to recount the testimony of
relevant federal officials on these matters.
1. Calvin Jenkins Depositions
Calvin Jenkins, Associate Director, Minority Enterprise
Program of the Small Business Administration, was deposed
in McCrossan on March 18, 1996 and in Rothe v. Department
of Defense126 on February 22, 1999 as the SBA expert on the
history and administration of the SBA 8(a) program. When
asked about the issue of group selection by the SBA, however,
Mr. Jenkins testified:
124. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1998).
125. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 716-17 (9th Cir.
1997). See also Associated Gen. Contractors v. City and County of San
Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 1987).
126. 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
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Q. As far as these racial classifications, would all of these
groups be included in the 8(a) program at the same time?
When they were first added to the program, did they all
come in at the same time?
A. No.
Q. Which ones were most recently added, do you know?
A. I believe subcontinent Asians. And I believe there is a
second group. I'm not sure which one it was.
Q. Why, for example, were subcontinent Asians added?
A. I'm not familiar with the decision that went in to that.
Q. Was it made by the SBA, or was it made by Congress?
A. It is my understanding that it was by both.
Q. Are you aware of any Congressional hearings to
consider the presumptive eligibility of these 8(a) groups?
A. No, I'm not familiar.
2 7
Later, Mr. Jenkins was asked about the general SBA
role in selecting presumptively eligible groups:
Q. I guess, maybe, the best way to say this is: Do you
know what role the SBA played in determining and
defining these various groups?
A. No, I do not."
Mr. Jenkins could not remember which groups
requesting socially disadvantaged status had been turned
down by the SBA and which groups had been accepted.129 He
stated:
Q. Are any, to your knowledge, of these groups selected by
looking to geographic area?
A. No, not to my knowledge.130
Whatever Associate Director Jenkins's knowledge, his
conclusion is wrong. Most of the Pacific island countries were
included in the 8(a) program with very little information
other than their geographical location.131
127. Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 64-65 (Mar. 18, 1996), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
128. Id. at 65-66.
129. See id. at 72.
130. Id. at 73.
131. See La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 444.
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Finally, narrow tailoring does not permit designation of
disadvantaged status to continue indefinitely; there must be
periodic review of the appropriateness of retaining each
presumptively disadvantaged group. However, the SBA has
no administrative process to make such a review. Calvin
Jenkins testified:
Q. Are the groups that are in there regularly reviewed by
SBA to see if they are the right groups and deserving of a
presumption under all the requirements of 13 C.F.R. Part
124?
A. No. SBA does not have a procedure in which we re-
review the groups once they have been approved there.
Q. Has there ever been any discussion within the SBA to
develop such rules?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Has any group ever been removed from the list?
A. Not to my knowledge.'
In addition to the designation of certain groups as
carrying the presumption of an individual's social
disadvantage, the 8(a) program must determine which
individuals will be permitted to designate themselves as
members of those benefited groups. In essence, the SBA
permits self-designation. Mr. Jenkins testified:
Q. When someone holds themselves out as a member of
one of these groups... is there any further inquiry,
generally speaking as to, whether they are in fact a
member of that group?
A. No. 1
33
Mr. Jenkins could not remember any instance when
anyone had challenged the presumption of social
disadvantage,3  but because the SBA regards the 8(a)
application information as confidential, it would be difficult
for anyone to acquire the facts to offer any challenge.
Mr. Jenkins testified that having a college education
132. Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 20 (Feb. 22, 1999), Rothe Dev. Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Defense, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999). See also Deposition
of William Fisher at 41 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14721.
133. Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 30-31 (Mar. 18, 1996), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
134. See id. at 32-33, 141.
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would not affect whether a person was considered socially
disadvantaged. The SBA does not inquire, and therefore,
would not know whether an applicant's family was wealthy,
so family wealth is not a factor in considering social
disadvantage. 135 Even a recent immigrant with no possible
history of discrimination in the United States, if now a
citizen, would still be considered socially disadvantaged by
the 8(a) program if the applicant claimed identification with a
designated racial or ethnic group.136
The SBA would not know if an applicant had actually
suffered societal discrimination or any other form of
discrimination. No fact about discrimination is ever verified
by the agency; discrimination is presumed whether or not the
person even claims it. While the SBA may review whether a
person continues to be economically disadvantaged, there is
no periodic review of social disadvantage. 11 7 The premise of
the federal MBE programs, then, is that once a person has
identified with a group that is presumptively socially
disadvantaged, that person will always be socially
disadvantaged regardless of their personal achievement.
That premise constitutes a governmental racial and ethnic
stereotype of the worst sort.
The SBA does not require that a presumptively eligible
person have suffered discrimination by the federal
government.1 8  Mr. Jenkins knew of no instance of any
discrimination by any federal contracting officer against an
8(a) firm. Nor was he aware of any discrimination by any
federal contracting officer against any person connected with
any "designated minority groups that are entitled to a
[presumption] of social disadvantage." In fact, Mr. Jenkins
knew of no instance of any discrimination by any federal
contracting officers or any procedures used by federal
contract officers that the SBA believed even had a "disparate
impact on minorities."3 9
2. William Fisher Deposition
Because Mr. Jenkins knew so little about the key issues,
135. See id. at 35.
136. See id. at 78-79, 142.
137. See id. at 133.
138. See id. at 144.
139. See Deposition of Calvin Jenkins at 52-53 (Mar. 18, 1996), McCrossan,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
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plaintiffs in the McCrossan case deposed William Alvin
Fisher, Acting Associate Administrator of the SBA's Office of
Minority Enterprise Development, on March 16, 1998, two
years after the Jenkins deposition. Mr. Fisher was sent the
list of questions quoted above 140 about the administration of
the 8(a) program and particularly about "the history and
criteria used by the SBA in establishing the racial or ethnic
groups which the SBA has determined by regulation are
entitled to presumptive 'social disadvantage' in the 8(a)
program."1 4 In his deposition, Mr. Fisher made a number of
statements which combined with those by Mr. Jenkins
suggests that the SBA either never had policies on a number
of constitutionally significant issues in the 8(a) program or
has forgotten what they are or where they came from.
Though designated as the government's 30(b)(6) expert
on the history and criteria used by the SBA to determine
group disadvantage, Mr. Fisher had no idea how certain
groups came to be designated as presumptively
disadvantaged.
Q. Do you have any knowledge about how these
subcategories [Black Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, subcontinent
Asian Americans] came to be included in section
124.105(B) of the Small Business Administration's
regulations?
A. I do not.
Q. You do not have any knowledge about how they came
to be included?
A. That predated me. I have no knowledge.4
When Mr. Fisher was questioned about the inclusion or
exclusion of the groups within these subcategories, he was no
more knowledgeable.
Q. What about the specific subgroups that are listed after
the term Asian Pacific Americans. Do you have any
information about how those subgroups came to be added
to the list?
A. I do not.
140. See Notice of Deposition to William Fisher (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 41.
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Q. Do you know why certain countries were included in
the list of subgroups, but not other countries?
A. I don't know .... 1
Q. Do you know why the former Soviet, now-independent
Asian republics are not included on the list of countries
entitled-countries in 124.105(B)?
A. No.
Q. Do you know why persons from Asia Minor or the
Middle East are not included in this list?
A. I don't know."
Not only did Mr. Fisher not know how various
nationalities came to be considered disadvantaged, he did not
know how the SBA defined whether a person was properly
identified with a presumptively eligible group.
Q. I don't think I asked you whether there is a working
definition of Asian Pacific Americans. Is there?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
14 5
Nor did Mr. Fisher know the definition for Native
Americans or how it was applied:
Q. Is the term Native American, to your knowledge,
defined in the SBA's regulations?
A. I don't know that it is.
146
Q. Do you know how the SBA would have come up with
this definition for native Hawaiian, if you know?
A. I don't.
Q. Do you have any idea why the date 1778 is used? [In
order to qualify as a Native Hawaiian, an individual must
be able to trace his lineage back at least as far as 1778,
the year Captain Cook arrived in the Islands.]
A. I don't.'
4 7
Nor was Mr. Fisher aware of whether his agency
conducted any investigation into the accuracy of an
143. Id. at 88.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 90.
146. Deposition of William Fisher at 91 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
147. Id. at 97.
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applicant's claims of belonging to a particular group. Mr.
Fisher testified:
Q. If a person applying to the 8(a) program states on the
application form that they identify themselves as Hispanic
American, does your office conduct any additional inquiry
into whether or not they are in fact a Hispanic American
on a routine basis?
A. I don't know.'4
Of course, such an inquiry would be difficult since Mr.
Fisher testified he was not aware of any working definition of
the term Hispanic American.1 4 9 Mr. Fisher was not aware of
whether the term Hispanic American was a racial category, 50
reflected persons whose ancestors came from certain
countries, required a person to speak Spanish,52 or have a
Spanish surname. 53 He believed "Hispanic American" did
not require that the person belong to any Hispanic
organizations.
The defendant's unwillingness or inability to investigate
claims of disadvantaged status extends beyond Hispanics.
Mr. Fisher testified:
Q. In your experience as the associate administrator,
have you ever had cause to question an individual's status
as a group member when that individual has represented
themselves as a group member on an application for
admittance into the 8(a) program?
A. I do not recall an instance where any of my offices have
questioned that and requested the individual to do so.1u
He went on:
Q. Can you tell me, sir, hypothetically any situation you
148. Id. at 55.
149. See id. at 59. The failure to have a working definition of "Hispanics,"
even though that group is eligible in almost all affirmative action programs has
troubled other courts. See Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County
of Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1069 (D. Colo. 2000). ("IT]here is no agreed
working definition of Hispanic persons since they may be of different races and
may have very different cultural, religious and geographic origins.") See also
Hernandez v. State, 742 A.2d 952, 964-65 (Md. 1999).
150. Deposition of William Fisher at 61 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
151. See id. at 65.
152. See id. at 71.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 75.
155. Id. at 62.
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can think of under which you might question someone's
identification with one of the designated groups?
A. I cannot."'6
Not only could Mr. Fisher not specify any SBA initiated
challenges, there have not apparently been any third party
challenges.
Q. Are you aware of any outside challenges to a person-




This concession was made despite Mr. Fisher's recognition
that he was the final authority on 8(a) applications.
Q. For each applicant to the 8A program, you make the
final decision; is that correct?
A. That's correct.158
The bureaucratic reality for both the 8(a) and SDB
programs is that all an applicant needs to do be accepted as
socially disadvantaged is check a box stating the applicant
was entitled to the presumption of social disadvantage by
identifying with the preferred groups.
Q. And if that box is checked, would there be any further
inquiry at any of the levels you previously described into
whether that person in fact was a member of the group
they indicated they identified with?
A. I don't know. That has not occurred since I've been
here.
Q. There hasn't been any additional investigations since
you've been there?
A. No, not that I'm aware of. 5
There is no requirement that a person belonging to the
8(a) designated groups actually demonstrate social
disadvantage. Mr. Fisher testified:
Q. But members who identify themselves with groups
that are entitled to a presumption of social disadvantage
156. Deposition of William Fisher at 63 (Mar. 16, 1998), C.S. McCrossan
Constr. Co. v. Cook, No. CIV. 95-1345-HB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721 (D.N.M.
Apr. 2, 1996).
157. Id. at 77.
158. Id. at 59.
159. Id. at 71-72.
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are not required to make an individualized showing: is
that correct?
A. That is correct.16
0
Nor apparently have persons made a voluntary showing of
social disadvantage.
161
According to Mr. Fisher, if a person clearly belonged or
identified with the designated group, 62 personal attributes (a
doctorate, leadership in a trade or professional association or
even elected office) would not effect the presumption of social
disadvantage, if it were clear the person belonged or
identified with the designated group. 163  Furthermore, the
presumption is a national one and applies to a person living
in a geographical area where the group identity might be a
disadvantage or an area where it is definitely an advantage,
such as Cuban Americans in Miami, Florida, for example. 164
Nor was Mr. Fisher knowledgeable about the standards
used to determine whether individuals were appropriately
identified with a group presumptively disadvantaged. The
number of Americans who are descendants of more than one
race and ethnic group is growing rapidly. The 2000 Census
contains a multi-racial category for the first time recognizing
the changing American demographic realities. However, the
SBA does not have any rules for determining what a multi-
racial individual needs to qualify as a member of a
presumptively eligible group. The plaintiffs tried to ascertain
if any rules exist by asking a number of hypothetical
questions.
Q. Would it be sufficient if a person held themselves out
or identified themselves as a Hispanic American for one
generation, or would they have had to identify for the
previous generations; in other words, my parents were
also Hispanic American, my grandparents were also
Hispanic American, or would it be sufficient for some
lesser period of time?
A. I don't know. 6'
160. Id. at 33.
161. See id. at 81.
162. See Deposition of William Fisher at 115-18 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 119-20.
165. Id. at 82.
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Nor did Mr. Fisher know how the SBA would determine
the presumptive eligibility of a person with one parent from a
presumptively eligible group (e.g., Chile) and another parent• .•166
from a non-presumptively eligible group (e.g., Ireland). Mr.
Fisher did not know whether a person with one great-
grandparent from a presumptively eligible group and seven
great grandparents from non-presumptively eligible groups
would be entitled to the presumption. 16 7  Mr. Fisher was
equally unaware of whether a person of Scottish ancestry
whose family lived in India for several generations could
claim identification as an Asian Pacific American; 6 8 but that
was because there is no working definition of an Asian Pacific
American at all.1
69
3. Requests for Admissions
In McCrossan, the plaintiff additionally asked a number
of group-specific questions in its requests for admission. For
example, plaintiffs asked whether the SBA used "any
particular measure of education or economic group
attainment" in determining whether particular groups were
entitled to the presumption of social and economic
disadvantage. The defendants responded that "defendants
admit that the SBA does not rely upon any particular
measure of educational attainment in isolation or any
particular measure of economic group attainment in isolation
to other factors but evaluates them along with the totality of
the circumstances." 70
The phrase "totality of the circumstances" serves to
obscure the fact that there were no standards applied across
the board to determine whether a group should be considered
presumptively socially disadvantaged. The fact is that the
SBA has never required any specific educational or economic
data or any other consistent or appropriate criteria in its
review of group eligibility. It has never even examined census
data easily available to the agency. Furthermore the
defendants conceded that "the totality of the circumstances"
166. See id. at 83.
167. See id. at 105-06.
168. See Deposition of Wiliam Fisher at 90 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721.
169. See id.
170. Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, request No. 9.
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are those brought to the SBA's "attention by the group
seeking inclusion." 171 In short, the SBA made no independent
analysis, but simply responded to those facts and allegations
the group or individual members of the group submitted.
The plaintiffs then asked whether the SBA has made any
studies of the history of discrimination suffered by
presumptively disadvantaged groups in America. The
defendants admitted that:
The SBA has not independently made or sponsored, nor
was it legally required to make or sponsor, any specific
studies regarding the history of discrimination suffered by
groups in America in making decisions to designate and
identify, or deny such designation and identification to
racial and ethnic groups as presumptively eligible for
"social disadvantage." 172
The government was then asked about the inclusion or
exclusion of specific groups from the category of
presumptively eligible groups. Some countries on the Asian
continent were included on the SBA list and others were not.
For example, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadjikistan are
not included and the SBA specifically rejected Iran in 1989.1"
The government conceded persons from some Asian
countries, but not others, were considered socially
disadvantaged. 174  It was then asked whether these
inclusion/exclusion decisions were based on any federally-
sponsored studies of the question. The defendant responded
by repeating "the totality of the circumstances" language and
admitted:
[DIefendants have made reasonable efforts to seek
information responsive to this request, are unaware of and
therefore cannot admit or deny that no federally-
sponsored study has ever been conducted to determine for
the purposes consistent with 13 C.F.R. §124.105(d) which
racial and ethnic groups whose origins are on the Asian
continent should be identified by the SBA as
171. Id.
172. Response to Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721, response to request No. 10.
173. See Letter from Joseph 0. Montes, Associate Administrator, Minority
Small Business and Capital Ownership Development to Gary J. Gasper,
Attorney, Sidley & Austin 3 (Jan. 6, 1989) (on file with authors).
174. See Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, request No. 11.
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presumptively eli ible for "social disadvantage" and those
which should not.
The government was next asked about the Hispanic
category, beginning with whether Congress had ever made
specific findings that "persons whose racial and ethnic origins
is from Portugal or Spain are deserving of the social
disadvantage designation or that other persons whose origins
are from other European countries are not. 17 6  The
defendants responded that after "reasonable inquiries" they
were unaware of whether Congress made any specific
findings about whether persons from Spain and Portugal
were deserving of the social disadvantaged designation, but
that "Defendants further admit that the SBA has interpreted
that American individuals from Portugal and Spain are of
Hispanic descent and are entitled to the same presumption of
Hispanic Americans."
17
There is no explanation in any document about why that
bureaucratic decision was made. Mr. Fisher did not know
when the SBA made the decision to include Portuguese on
the presumptively eligible list or why they were added.
Persons from Portugal speak Portuguese, not Spanish,
and have had their own national history since the 12th
century when Alfonso Henriques became the first king of
Portugal in 1150. The U.S. Census Bureau Survey of
Hispanic-owned businesses does not list Portugal as an
appropriate country of origin for inclusion. Actually, the SBA
has produced no evidence that demonstrates that persons
from European backgrounds from Spain or Portugal (who are
presumed socially disadvantaged) are in fact any more
socially disadvantaged than European persons from Bosnia or
Ukraine (who are not presumed socially disadvantaged).
The government was also asked for admissions regarding
Congressional or SBA findings concerning other Hispanic
sub-groups (Mexican American, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central
175. Id., response to request No. 12.
176. Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, request No. 14.
177. Id.
178. Deposition of William Fisher at 85-85 (Mar. 16, 1998), McCrossan, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721. See also Ass'n for Fairness in Bus., Inc. v. New Jersey,
82 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 2000) (striking down a state MWBE requirement for
New Jersey casino licensees on both compelling interest and narrow tailoring
grounds and questioning why Portuguese were included among the favored
ethnic groups).
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or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese origin)
considered presumptively eligible. 179 The defendants replied
that the SBA did not "make any findings of 'social
disadvantage"' using the requirements specified by 13 C.F.R.
124.105(c) for all or substantially all persons in each of the
above-designated subgroups of Hispanic American when it
designated or identified each group as "'socially
disadvantaged' for the purposes of the 8(a) program."8 °
Further, with regard to Congress, the defendants admitted:
They have made reasonable inquiry and that, based upon
information known and reasonably available, they are
unable to admit or deny the remaining portion of this
Request for Admission, that is whether Congress obtained
any factual basis for any findings of "social disadvantage"
using the requirements specified by 13 C.F.R. §124.105(c)
for all or substantially all persons from each of the above-
designated subgroups when the SBA designated or
identified each Hispanic American subgroup as "socially
181disadvantaged" for the purposes of the 8(a) program.
The plaintiffs next turned to requesting admissions about
findings regarding the particular groups from Africa that are
entitled to presumptive eligibility. The concept the SBA uses
is that the person must be from one of the "original racial
groups of Africa,"82 thus excluding persons from Morocco,
Algeria, and possibly Egypt. Since many anthropologists
believe the origins of the human species are in Africa, it
might be argued that we are all descendants of the "original
racial groups of Africa."8 3  The defendants translate this
concept into the term "Black American" which they do not
further define, although they admit as they did with requests
about previous groups, that neither Congress nor the SBA
was required to make any findings of "social disadvantage for
Black Americans."84
179. See Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, request Nos. 17-18.
180. See Response to Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721, response to request No. 10.
181. Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, request No. 18.
182. See id., request No. 20.
183. See Natalie Angier, Do Races Differ? Not Really, Genes Show, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at Fl.
184. See Requests for Admission (Mar. 10, 1998), McCrossan, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14721, request Nos. 19-20.
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Regarding each group, all that the defendants asserted
was that there was evidence "available" to Congress that
"direct federal procurement and federally-assisted
procurement were being disproportionately denied to
businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals."185  The government cited no basis for the
determination of disproportion. No study has been released
which compares the receipt of federal procurements by
qualified small businesses owned by persons presumptively
socially and economically disadvantaged and qualified small
businesses owned by persons without that designation.
186
Further, the government possesses no evidence about the
receipts from federal contracting broken out by specific group.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Administration's current position is that there does
not need to be a separate justification for the inclusion of each
specific group granted the presumption of disadvantage.1
87
That position is contrary to the historical development of the
concept of presumptive eligibility and to the current law.
Croson, for example, concluded that it was necessary to
justify the inclusion of Eskimos and Aleuts specifically in the
Richmond program. 88  Generalizations about the larger
185. Id., request No. 2.
186. On June 23, 1998, long after the SBA made its decisions about groups,
the federal government released the so-called "benchmark limits" study which
shows that SDBs were underutilized in some SIC codes and overutilized or
appropriately utilized in others. 63 Fed. Reg. 357,114 (1998). On the basis of
this study, the SDB program will not be applicable in SICs where there is no
evidence of underutilization; neither the 8(a) nor the DOT DBE programs is
bound by the study results. The study contains serious methodological flaws.
See George R. La Noue, To the "Disadvantaged" Go the Spoils?, 138 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 91 (2000). See also John Sullivan & Roger Clegg, More Preferences
for Minority Businesses, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1998, at A13. Furthermore, the
study is not group specific and treats SDBs as a single category.
187. In its motion for summary judgment in Rothe the Justice Department
argued, "Strict scrutiny does not require Congress or Defendants to make
specific findings of discrimination with respect to each of the hundreds of racial,
national, and ethnic subgroups that live in the United States before taking
action to remedy discrimination against the larger groups into which those
subgroups fall." Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep't
of Defense, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
188. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506. See also Monterey
Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997). Monterey Mechanical
discusses the Aleuts, "a distinct people native to the western part of the Alaska
peninsula and the Aleutian Islands, [who] have suffered brutal oppression
repeatedly in their history." Id. at 714. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
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category of Native Americans, of which Eskimos and Aleuts
are a part, were not enough. The historical record shows
that, in fact, there were separate decisions made by Congress
and the SBA about the groups which should be granted the
presumption based on national or racial origin over a period
of two decades. Since the decision to grant or deny
presumptive eligibility was made separately for each group, it
follows that evidence must exist to establish a predicate for
each separate group. If persons from some Asian and
European countries, but not others, are considered socially
disadvantaged, that decision has to be based on evidence to
survive strict scrutiny. Similarly, if the only African
Americans entitled to the presumption are descendants of the
"original peoples," but not others who have populated the
continent for centuries, there has to be a documented
predicate. Finally, consistent definitions of what it means to
be identified with a particular group are essential in multi-
cultural America, if group based preferences are to meet
strict scrutiny.
Federal regulations are quite clear about which
particular racial and ethnic group identifications create the
presumption of social disadvantage. The regulations list
forty-six different groups. For example, if a person identifies
as a Nepalese American, he or she is entitled to the
presumption of social disadvantage, while a person
identifying as an Afghani American is not. A Basque from
Spain is eligible; a Basque from France is not. Congress
added some groups; the SBA added others.
As this review shows, no consistent rationale for favoring
the groups enjoying the presumption exists. No statistical
measure of the comparative social disadvantage of included
and excluded groups has ever been made by the government
during the more than two decades the concept of presumptive
eligibility has existed. No measure of actual discrimination
against particular groups has ever been attempted. All
decisions on group eligibility were made before Croson and
not even the Adarand decision has prompted any review of
the preferred groups. There has never been a review of
whether groups, once granted preferred status, should
declared it would be frivolous to suggest that the State of California had
actively or passively discriminated against Aleuts in the awarding of
construction contracts. Id.
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continue to have it although there have been enormous
demographic changes in the United States in the recent
years. For the federal procurement preferences, the operative
guidelines have been "once in, always in."
For a firm owner to be considered socially disadvantaged,
the person must be "identified" with one of the presumptively
eligible groups. But what does that identification actually
mean? SBA officials testified that the agency has no working
definition of either the Hispanic or Asian American category.
To be a Hispanic, a person need not speak Spanish, have a
Spanish last name or have any particular identification with
Hispanic organizations. There are no rules or policies that
would determine whether persons of mixed parentage, an
increasingly common situation in the United States, are
considered socially disadvantaged. Nor apparently is there
any social achievement, no matter how distinguished, that
would render a person identified with one of the listed groups
as no longer socially disadvantaged. Thus, no combination of
education, civic or cultural attainment or recognition renders
a person no longer socially disadvantaged. Movie stars and
cabinet officers identifying with any of the listed groups
belonging to one of the listed groups are still considered
"socially disadvantaged," while no amount of personal
hardship could be used by a person from an unlisted group to
claim social disadvantage. That person must undertake the
bureaucratic burden that very few have successfully lifted to
prove that, as an individual, he or she has been discriminated
against. In contrast, those presumptively socially
disadvantaged have only to check a box indicating racial or
ethnic status. They do not have to prove anything about their
social status. In particular, they do not have to prove that
they or their company have suffered from discrimination by
the federal government or anyone else.
While it might have been reasonable to assume that
some place in the federal administrative process there must
be studies or at least a set of rules for making the decision of
which groups should receive the preference and which should
not, that is not the case. For an issue of such huge economic
importance, affecting billions of dollars of federal contracting
and major constitutional significance after Croson and
Adarand, it is extraordinary that there are no such study or
rules. It has been only after the discovery process in
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McCrossan, Sherbrooke, and now Rothe, that it is clear that
the government does not have this information. The process
from beginning to end has been political and now the
government officials administering the program cannot even
remember how the decisions were made. Even more
surprising, in the light of the hostile reception the concept of
presumptive eligibility has received from the courts and the
extensive post-Adarand review about other related issues,
the government has announced no plans to re-examine the
list of included and excluded groups at any time in the future.
Perhaps if the decisions about group social disadvantage
had been made after Croson, the decisions would have been
based on some objective measures. Still in modern America,
group measures of social disadvantage will be crude and over-
inclusive. In any event, the concept of presumptive eligibility
as used by the SBA and relied on by many other agencies is
trapped in a time warp without any social science basis. It
reflects no demographic reality and its presumptions are
really stereotypes, inconsistent with the development of law
in the post-Croson and post-Adarand era.189 The courts have
made it clear that rights belong to individuals, not groups.
Presumptive eligibility should be replaced with a policy that
targets aspiring entrepreneurs of any race or ethnicity who
have endured measurable disadvantage.
189. The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court regarding racial
classifications was in Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S.Ct. 1044 (2000), as follows:
One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification
is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by
ancestry instead of by his or her own personal merit and essential
qualities. An inquiry into ancestral lines is not consistent with respect
based on the unique personality each of us possesses, a respect the
Constitution itself secures in its concern for persons and citizens.
Id. at 1057.
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